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The rising ubiquity of the Internet of Things (IoT) 
has heralded a new era of increasingly prolific and 
damaging IoT-centric security threat vectors. Fast-
paced market demand for multi-featured IoT products 
urge companies, and their software engineers, to bring 
products to market quickly, often at the cost of 
security. Lack of proper security threat analysis 
tooling during development, testing, and release 
cycles exacerbate security concerns. In this paper, we 
augment a security threat analysis tool to use audit 
hooks, open-source information capture components, 
and machine learning techniques to profile dynamic 
wearable and IoT operations spanning multiple 
components during execution. Our tool encourages 
data-drive threat identification and analysis 
approaches that can help software engineers perform 
dynamic testing and threat analysis to mitigate code-
level vulnerabilities that lead to attacks in IoT 
applications.  Our approach is evaluated by means of 
a case study involving a system evaluation across 
several common attack vectors. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Internet of Things (IoT) is a term that both refers 
to actual devices (i.e. “things” on an internet-
connected network) and an architectural paradigm. 
Things in the IoT may be as small as a single sensor in 
a toaster that sends an alert when the toast is ready to 
automobile components that collect, analyze, and 
make decisions on real-time driving data, to wearable 
watches and other devices that capture human 
activities for bio-feedback and exercise tracking 
purposes. Depending on the commercial, medical, and 
personal use cases, data collected by IoT devices may 
be particularly personal (e.g. pacemaker or glucometer 
logs) [1] or  highly sensitive (e.g. GPS coordinates that 
could be used to track user movements) [2]. For 
instance, in a widely reported side-channel, GPS 
coordinates from the Strava fitness wearables on 
military service members made its way onto world 
maps, inadvertently revealing the location and 
commonly used walking pathways of several secret 
military installations [3]. 
As IoT devices have proliferated into the wider 
internet to the tune of nearly 10 billion devices [4], the  
risks of misuse have also undoubtedly increased in 
diversity and likelihood. This comports with the 
increasing number of high profile attacks, such as the 
Mirai Botnet [5] which briefly shut down access to a 
large swath of high traffic websites by coopting and 
misusing unprotected digital video recorders (DVRs) 
owned by unsuspecting users, and with academic and 
industry studies of the IoT threat landscape [6].  These 
studies have highlighted several features of wearables 
and, more broadly, IoT, such as sensing and 
communication capabilities, always-on network 
connectivity, and pervasive embedded locations, that 
make them particularly vulnerable to attack. 
As with other software and hardware design and 
development, security in IoT systems is often an 
afterthought [7] to getting products to market. The 
problem is exacerbated by the paradigmatic 
assumptions of IoT – which emphasize low power 
hardware, plug-and-play modular design, and low or 
no configuration. While many threat analysis and 
evaluative testing tools exist for web and network-
based penetration testing [8-10], IoT designers and 
developers face a lack of robust evaluative tooling for 
examining potential threats that span more than one 
component of their product architecture (e.g. an attack 
that involves a chain of events from the network, a 
phone, an IoT device, and a web site). 
This lack of parity between traditional network and 
web penetration testing tooling (e.g. Wireshark [8], 
Nmap [9] Metasploit [10], etc.), and tooling available 
for pen-testing IoT hardware, Bluetooth networks, and 
mobile app analysis has largely translated to less time 
spent on IoT product security evaluations [6]. 
This paper develops and documents a set of audit 
hooks and data capture mechanisms for accumulating 
threat intelligence from multiple sources and 
perspectives (e.g. app data, Bluetooth data, web 
traffic, etc) and combining it to identify potential 
security threats and direct mitigation efforts in IoT. 
Using these data capture mechanisms, we augment a 
testbed, created in prior work [11], called SecuWear so







Figure 1. High-level overview of the SecuWear IoT testbed using audit hooks to gather, accumulate 
and analyze data to identify attack scenarios and direct mitigation efforts.  
that it is capable of identifying attacks in IoT systems 
which include one or more IoT devices, an android-
based mobile application, one or more web services, 
and the communication mediums between them, i.e. 
Bluetooth / Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and IP 
networks. The testbed design is shown in Figure 1. 
Here a particular device is communicating with an 
Android app over BLE, using functions foo1 and foo2, 
which are subsequently interacting with a RESTful 
API in a web service using endpoints bar1 and bar2. 
Audit hooks are placed in each function on the app, 
endpoint on the webservice, and on passive network 
listening tools – including an Ubertooth (a low-cost, 
open source, Bluetooth monitoring hardware device) 
and a network tap feeding data to WireShark. The 
design and placement of the audit hooks allow them to 
operate in real-time as an application executes to 
capture ephemeral events and internal data that may 
exist only within the scope of the function and/or for 
the duration of the process. The testbed gathers events, 
pools them with other data gathered from other 
components in the architecture and creates event traces 
of execution that can be used to profile normalcy, 
identify potentially adherent behavior that may be 
associated with known attack vectors, and/or detect 
new types of attacks. In this sense, SecuWear is a 
testbed that facilitates dynamic testing during 
development or monitoring, when an app has been 
deployed to production. Analysis in SecuWear is app 
specific since the data gathered may vary between 
applications. More information about the audit hooks 
and analysis techniques is provided in Section 3.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviews relevant literature. Section 3 
describes the design model of the tool, the design 
decisions underlying the developed audit hooks, the 
process followed to pull information gained from audit 
hooks together with other sources of information such 
as that from Ubertooth, Web servers, and network 
data. Section 4 demonstrates the feasibility of 
differentiating between behaviors associated with 
attack and normal operations of a real-world IoT 
system. A case study involving an IoT device, an 
Android App, and an advertisement web server is used 




2.1. Security concerns in IoT and wearables 
 
Security weaknesses in IoT arise due to range of 
root causes related to the functional behavior of the 
IoT device in question [11, 12], processes which occur 
during operation [7], and the multiple security 
domains the devices operation within [13]. Typical 
IoT devices interact with higher-powered devices such 
as smart phones and web services, as well as other IoT 
devices. Interaction often occurs over Bluetooth or 
BLE, and Wi-Fi. Given the highly integrated 
architecture and low-powered hardware involved in 
IoT, the existence of a vulnerability in a connected 
app, component, or service, can potentially lead to the 
compromise of the IoT device [14]. Wearables devices 
are particularly vulnerable due to computational and 
power limits [12] which limit the implementation of 
strong encryption and authentication protocols. BLE is 
susceptible to range of attacks from passive 
eavesdropping to active interference [7, 15]. Apps and 
devices are also sources of concern given the wide 
range of vulnerabilities targeting operating systems 
such as the published CVE entries for Android [16].  
Page 7147
 
Gegick and Williams [17], suggest that attacks on 
wearables are often based on small and known attacks, 
that act as gateways for larger and more sophisticated 
attacks. Their work highlights the common, often 
unmaintained, stagnancy of IoT device software – 
which go unpatched, allowing for vulnerability re-use 
by attackers. Design flaws are also a large source of 
concern [18]. These flaws emerge, among other 
reasons, due to poor consideration of security 
requirements [18]. No matter how secure software 
engineers claim their application to be there are always 
weaknesses that can be exploited to break in. 
Appropriate evaluative tooling has also been identified 
as a critical pre-requisite for secure software [12].  
 
2.2. Multi-component threat analysis system   
 
Multi-component threat analysis (MCA) is a 
system-spanning activity that identifies and profiles 
potential threats which may span one or more 
components in the system. IoT applications often 
incorporate many components and services, making 
MCA a critical part of overall system evaluation. 
Siboni et al. [12] developed a security testbed 
framework for MCA of wearable applications. Their 
approach examines a wide range of wearable devices 
that transmit data through variety of communication 
channels including WiFi, Zigbee and Bluetooth. Their 
framework enables security testing based on memory 
consumption, CPU utilization, and the file system of 
the device during context-based attacks (when 
different simulators maliciously trigger internal 
sensors) and data attacks (when external signals and 
data manipulate the sensors). It spans components, 
considers device activities upon identifying a threat, 
but does not collect or monitor real-time event traces 
and does not identify application level vulnerabilities.  
Intrusion detection, and intrusion detection 
systems (IDS), are related concepts within the scope of 
MCA which focus, specifically, on the identification 
of threats in real-time data – often for the purpose of 
mitigating or preventing threat-actors from conducting 
network-based attacks [19]. Zhang et al. [20] presents 
an IDS architecture for examining and preventing 
attacks in mobile wireless networks. Their architecture 
is based on an ad-hoc routing protocol which discovers 
the network topology of a wireless network and then 
monitors it to build notions of normality. While their 
approach is useful for detecting anomalies in mobile 
wireless networks environments, it does not identify 
threats spanning component boundaries in IoT.  
Across MCA research in IoT, much work has 
focused on network-data [20] spanning components, 
but little has been done to extract disparate, differently 
tiered data from the components themselves to analyze 
the security posture of the overall system [21]. One 
potential in-roads towards component-based MCA in 
IoT are audit hooks. Audit hooks are small functional 
insertions that occur within programs and functions 
that allow components to pass operational information 
up to an, often central, auditor. Audit hooks have been 
used and studied extensively within the web services 
community as a means to examine and track security 
behavior across service compositions [22]. Here, a 
central auditor collects information from contributing 
audit hooks, combines the information to synthesize 
an analysis to determine if the composition is meeting 
its service requirements (or service levels), and then 
alerts stakeholders if the constraints are not met [22]. 
Others in the IoT MCA research community have 
highlighted audit hooks as options for IoT systems 
[23], but to our knowledge no frameworks make wide 
usage of audit hooks to integrate data across multiple 
disparate components and differing abstractions in IoT 
architectures (e.g. data arising from functional 
execution of code on smartphones, connected 
webservices, and the IoT device hardware). 
 
2.3. Identifying attacks with machine learning 
 
Using machine learning (ML) to identify attacks is 
not a new concept. The earliest application we found 
was in 1975, where Carlstedt et al. [17] abstracted 
system calls, data stores and other entities in operating 
system source code into generalized patterns and used 
them to find security flaws. They used concepts such 
as finite state automata (FSA) to show that sequence 
of events could result in an attack in practice. 
Graphical structures such as attack trees, attack nets 
were also proposed for threat identification.  
More advanced ML approaches including 
classifiers [20, 24] have been used by intrusion 
detection systems to differentiate between different 
types of traffic according to signatures of behavior. 
For instance, Zhang, Lee, and Huang, [20] apply two 
classification models: (i) RIPPER and (ii) SVM-light 
to separate data into attack or non-attack classes in 
mobile ad-hoc networks. Their approach relies on 
attack patterns to characterize and train their models. 
The efficacy of attack patterns and model-based threat 
detection is predicated on the notion that normal and 
intrusion activities have distinct and detectable 
behaviors [20]. Attack patterns, in this sense, are class 
attributes (features) that exist during attack scenarios.  
ML algorithms utilize these attack patterns and 
classify data into either one of the classes based on 
presence or absence of known patterns. 
Buczak and Guven [24] survey and explore how 
various ML approaches can be used for cyber security 
applications. Among others, they examined 
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applications of artificial neural networks, Bayesian 
networks, support vector machine, and decision trees 
for classification of security data into classes 
associated with attack patterns. For each approach, 
they provide and apply typical ML comparison criteria 
such accuracy, positive prediction value (or precision), 
sensitivity, and specificity, to security problems. Their 
work highlights the role of ML for security problems 
such as anomaly detection and misuse case detection. 
In addition, they identify the following steps in using 
ML for security-related data: 
- Clean and prepare data into test and training sets. 
- Identify class attributes (features) from the 
training set to characterize attack patterns. 
- Identify the subset of attributes necessary for 
classification (i.e. dimensionality reduction). 
- Train the model on the features. 
- Using trained model to classify samples in test set. 
- Measure and evaluate model. 
 
3. Audit Hooks for Dynamic IoT Testing  
 
The design of the SecuWear testbed makes 
extensive use of developer-customizable audit hooks 
inserted into different method, components, and 
network channels within the architecture of an IoT 
app. The audit hooks serve to intercept function calls, 
messages, or events passed between software 
components and must exist within and across 
components to capture interactions and transmissions 
as they occur in IoT devices or wearables and 
collaborating smartphones and web services. The audit 
hooks can operate on a real-time basis and capture data 
that might exist only in an internal form or only for the 
duration of the process. Appropriate placement of 
audit hooks is critical to detecting anomalies. Once 
events are captured, they are fed into a centralized 
server. The server combines events gathered from 
multiple perspectives (e.g. function data, device data, 
packet data, etc) and compiles it into an event trace to 
prepare it for analysis, before finally producing a 
vulnerability analysis report with any findings. The 










Figure 2. Schema used for events in the trace 
Each event item in the trace includes the fields: 
created which is a unix timestamp identifying when 
the event was captured; domain which identifies where 
the event originated (can take on the discrete values 
such as IoT device, mobile app, web or identifiers for 
the underlying networks); eventtype is a high level 
category of events which exist within a domains (e.g. 
“function execution” or “error handler”); event is the 
specific type of event that exists within the eventtype 
category (e.g. “foo invoked”); codereference is the 
specific line of code where the event originated; data 
is a field which allows for more specific information 
such as an error log or I/O data related to the event to 
be logged (e.g. packet information on a network-based 
event); size is the size of data and is mostly used for 
binary data (such as network traffic); finally, run is the 
event trace the event item exists within.  
In this section, we discuss the design decisions that 
led to the creation of the audit hooks, the process the 
audit hooks and analysis server follow to pool, 
aggregate, and synthesize event traces, and the specific 
series of steps developers must follow to use the audit 
hooks and testbed to analyze an application of interest. 
 
3.1. Audit hook requirements 
 
Several requirements guided the creation of the 
audit hooks: (1) they must be applicable across 
differing apps, (2) they must be useful regardless of 
the IoT/wearable device being evaluated, (3) they 
must capture a range of information to characterize 
behavior across the entirety of an IoT system 
architecture, and (4) they must support event-trace 
analysis techniques.  
 
3.2. Designing the hooks 
 
To meet these requirements, we created three 
separate types of audit hooks, one for passive 
Bluetooth network taps, one for smartphone apps 
(particularly for usage in the functions interacting with 
wearable or IoT hardware), and one for insertion into 
any potentially collaborating web services. Each hook 
type is reviewed below. 
The first type of hook, for gathering Bluetooth 
data, sits on top of the open-source Ubertooth project. 
Ubertooth comes out of the box with an embedded 
driver and command line interface (CLI) capable of 
capturing packets on Bluetooth and BLE networks. 
Captured packets are converted automatically by the 
Ubertooth firmware into a Wireshark-ready format 
(PCAP) that is typical of network traffic analysis. Our 
audit hook intercedes on the Ubertooth firmware to 
collect and send captured packet data to the SecuWear 
aggregation server (where other event data is 
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gathered). This particular hook was developed using a 
Python library called PyShark [25]. Ubertooth 
captures data including the advertising header of the 
packet, mac addresses for source and target, BLE 
protocol type, and the specific data for transmission. 
These data broadly and narrowly characterize the 
communication behaviors of an IoT system of interest. 
Packet data is widely researched, so alone, this is not 
a novel invention. The novelty of using Ubertooth data 
is in its combination with data from other audit hooks.  
The second kind of audit hook is useful within apps 
on smartphones exchanging information with a 
wearable or IoT device. This kind of hook 
characterizes the specific temporal ordering of 
functional execution and data operations on the phone 
related to data from the wearable or IoT device. This 
type of hook, referred to henceforth by its classname 
AppHook was developed for Android  using the open-
source OkHttp [26] library. OkHttp provides utilities 
for making HTTP requests and handling the responses. 
AppHooks allow software developers to instantiate the 
event schema in Figure 2 with data specific to their 
application, such as data arising from functional 
execution in a function of interest in their architectural 
design. The AppHook class, shown in Figure 3, 
encapsulates event logging to the SecuWear server.  
To use an AppHook, a developer needs only to 
import the class, decide where they wish to log 
information in their app, instantiate the AppHook class 
by calling its constructor (lines 12-14) and passing it 
the url where the SecuWear aggregation server is 
running, and then call the logEvent method (lines 16-
31 in Figure 3) at the chosen location, passing it the 
information they wish to log. In most cases the 
SecuWear testbed is run locally, meaning the url 
would be http://localhost/api/events/, if the developer 
wishes to capture information after an app has gone 
into production, they would host SecuWear online and 
then use the url where the platform is running. Any 
information deemed relevant can be passed to 
logEvent as specified in the schema in Figure 2. 
The third type of hook allows developers to log 
information arising from connected web services, such 
as internal information communicated to it by the app, 
or other functions executing on aggregate data on the 
web server. For web requests, SecuWear provides a 
web-platform agnostic API endpoint for logging data. 
The API format conforms to JSONAPI standard [27] 
and exposes the event schema in Figure 2. The 
SecuWear event logging API is web service platform 
agnostic (meaning it works with any webserver of 
interest). As an example, we implemented a method, 
using the Httplib2 [28] library an open-source HTTP 
client library for Python, which can be used by Python-
based webservers, such as Django [29] to log 
information of interest. The example implementation 
is shown in Figure 4. This script exemplifies API 
invocation and would look similar (albeit with 
different library usage) for other web application 
server languages. 
 
import okhttp3.Call;   1 
import okhttp3.Callback;  2 
import okhttp3.FormBody;  3 
import okhttp3.Request;  4 
import okhttp3.OkHttpClient; 5 
import okhttp3.RequestBody; 6 
           7 
public class AppHook {   8 
 String secuwear_endpoint = "";  9 
 OkHttpClient client;  10 
          11 
 AppHook (String api_url){ 12 
  secuwear_endpoint = api_url; 13 
  client = new OkHttpClient(); 14 
   }          15 
   public void logEvent(Long time, String e, String type,  16 
  String ref, String size, String data) 17 
   {          18 
     RequestBody body = new FormBody.Builder() 19 
       .add("created", time.toString()) 20 
       .add("eventtype", type) 21 
       .add("event", e )  22 
       .add("codereference", ref) 23 
       .add("size", size) 24 
       .add("data", data) 25 
       .add("domain", "Mobile") 26 
       .build();     27 
            28 
   Request request = new Request.Builder(); 29 
   request.url(secuwear_endpoint).post(body).build(); 30 
 }          31 
}           32 
Figure 3. Mobile app audit hook in Android 
import time       1 
import httplib2     2 
import urllib      3 
           4 
def webHook(url, time, event, type, coderef, size, data): 5 
 payload = {      6 
  'created': time.time() * 1000, # convert to ms   7 
  'eventtype': type,   8 
  'event': event,   9 
  'codereference': coderef, 10 
  'size': size,    11 
  'data': data,    12 
   'domain': "WebApp",  13 
 }          14 
 body = urllib.urlencode(payload) 15 
 headers = {'Content-type': 'application/x-www-form- 16 
       urlencoded'} 17 
 channel = httlib2.Http() 18 
 channel.request(url, headers, method="POST", body) 19 
Figure 4. Code snippet of web audit hook 
 
All three hook types, i.e. Bluetooth logging, 
Mobile AppHooks, and web service audit hooks 
(including API information and the example 
implementation) have been open sourced and are 
available on GitHub. Each hook is, respectively, 
available in [30, 31, 32]. 
 
3.3. Using the audit hooks in practice 
 
The audit hooks, when taken together capture data 
end-to-end across an IoT application architecture. By 
collecting data from different perspectives, security 
evaluators and software developers can gain insight 
into the cross-boundary behaviors of the components 
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in their application architecture, identify problem 
areas, and direct their mitigation efforts. To use the 
testbed, a developer or evaluator needs to inject the 
hooks, determine and launch attack scenarios of 
interest on the IoT system, and then use SecuWear to 
analyze the results to determine if the app was 
vulnerable to attack or to discover potential issues.  
When injecting the hooks, a developer needs to 
determine where to place the audit hooks. Analysis is 
only as good as the quality, quantity, and coverage of 
data captured in the system. Often, developers have 
design documents, software architectures, and risk 
assessments that can direct placement to components 
of most concern. If developers are unsure about 
placement, we recommend injecting a hook into each 
method that has sensitive or critical data assets. 
The second step in the process involves launching 
scenarios of interest to profile the behavior of the 
system, as captured by the audit hooks, and construct 
a model of correct behavior. Once ‘normal’ 
operational states are known, the developer can launch 
various forms of attacks and observe the system 
behavior to determine if problems exist or the system 
is vulnerable to attack. In practice, this may mean a 
series of tests launched as part of the DevOps process 
during development or it may mean monitoring 
systems in production to gather more robust test data.  
Analyzing the results can be both manual and 
automated. In this work, we demonstrate a proof-of-
concept supervised machine learning technique for 
training a model on correct and normal system 
behaviors and malicious abnormal behaviors 
associated with attacks. We then use the model to 
determine if attacks have occurred. When attacks are 
detected in this way, the event traces which led to 
detection can be recalled by the SecuWear analysis 
server and presented to the developer or evaluator to 
direct mitigation efforts to certain components. 
 
3.4. Modeling normalcy with machine learning 
 
As an example of the types of analysis that can 
occur, we explored supervised machine learning 
techniques for building classifiers. Here, each model 
is trained with labeled data of several types including 
normal operational data observed during the typical 
operation of the system and operational data gathered 
when the system is under some form of attack. In this 
paper, we examined four multi-class classification 
algorithms: logistic regression, one-vs-one SVM, 
multinomial Naïve Bayes, and K-NN to test their 
efficacy for determining non-attacks from attacks. 
In practice, a developer or security evaluator could 
use the classifiers in production or during testing in the 
DevOps process (e.g. before releasing a build) by 
launching attack scenarios as shown in Figure 1 to 
determine if the system is vulnerable to attack. During 
development this could highlight abnormal behavior 
that could be patched before release. If used in 
production, the classifier could serve as a monitor to 
detect abnormal behavior and alert the developer to the 
potential for misuse. The specifics of our analysis 




To evaluate the audit hooks in the SecuWear 
testbed we used a case study. We applied the audit 
hooks to an example IoT system, gathered data about 
its operation under attack and normal conditions, and 
then used the machine learning techniques introduced 
in Section 3 to analyze the results.  
 
4.1. The case 
 
The case for further study is as follows. A 
developer is writing code for multi-component IoT 
system that includes a fitness tracking wearable with 
accelerometer, barometer, and thermistor sensors – 
similar to those on a Fitbit. The wearable will send its 
data to an Android app which will display recent 
accelerometer and temperature data. Bluetooth LE will 
be used for communication between the watch and the 
app. The app will interface with a webservice to store 
historical temperature and accelerometer data over 
time for the user to review in aggregate. The Android 
app will also display advertisements from a third-party 
advertisement provider service.  
The wearable watch will be based on a MetaWearC 
[33] hardware device, chosen for its open-source API, 
low cost, and variety of sensors. The MetaWear C has 
an accelerometer, barometer, and thermistor [33], 
among other sensors. The developer wants to support 
all versions of Android above 6.0.1(Marshmallow) to 
support most of the Android market. Figure 5 shows a 
component-based system diagram of the proper 
operational flow expected by the developer in the case. 
As it shows, the developer has chosen to use an 
Android WebView [34] to insert web-based 
advertisements (i.e. HTML, JavaScript, CSS). 
 
Figure 5: Component-based system diagram 
and expected data flow of the case system 
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4.2. Attack scenarios in the case 
 
The developer wants to evaluate the system for 
potential security vulnerabilities. In this case, the 
developed system is vulnerable to two attacks. The 
first scenario involves a malicious advertisement that 
has made it onto the third-party advertising service. 
Similar attacks have been described in [35]. The 
advertisement infects devices it is displayed on by 
injecting a short JavaScript script into any affected 
devices to collect all exposed variables within its 
scope and periodically read and send their values to a 
malicious logging server. This is an example of data 
exfiltration. The system vulnerability which allows for 
this attack, called code injection, to occur is that the 
system does not properly escape scripts, allowing code 
to be loaded and executed at run time. The code 
injection attack scenario is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Code-injection attack allows 
malicious JavaScript to exfiltrate sensor data 
to an attacker’s server. 
 
The second attack involves misuse of permissions. 
In this case, the system exposes all of its variables to 
the advertisement web view using an Android 
JavaScript interface. This means that the WebView 
component in the app has access to the sensor data 
from the wearable, the state variables which identify 
the url where the fitness aggregator service exists, and 
other data in the program. This type of poor permission 
handling shows that the app has not implemented least 
privilege and has given the code controlling the 
advertisement integration more privileges than it 
needs allowing it to read and write to variables such as 
the sensor values, i.e. the temperature and 
accelerometer sensor data from the wearable. In this 
attack the malicious advertisement interrupts 
communication with the fitness aggregation service by 
replacing the web service URL with a new URL which 
points to a malicious server. This drastically affects 
acts a denial of service – since it prevents the correct 
operation of the app. Other similar attacks might re-
write sensor variables affecting data integrity. The 
denial of service attack scenario is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Denial of service and exfiltration 
attack prevents normal operation while also 
sending data to the attacker’s server. 
4.3. Implementation of the case 
 
We implemented the case exactly as described to 
evaluate SecuWear and the audit hooks. To realize the 
fitness use cases, we forked the open-source 
MetaWear Android app [33] on GitHub. This app 
already has out-of-the-box code to interact with the 
MetaWearC, pull temperature, accelerometer, and 
other sensor data from the device, and display it 
graphically in the app. We modified the app to have a 
WebView which display ads from an advertisement 
server. We also modified the app to send its 
temperature and accelerometer data to a data 
aggregator service. For the data aggregator service, we 
setup a simple Django server with two API endpoints 
– one that accepts temperature and one that accepts 
accelerometer data.  
To create the advertising server, we built a small 
php server to serve three different advertisements, one 
legitimate, two malicious. The vulnerabilities shown 
in Figures 6 and 7 were embedded in the MetaWear 
app. The two malicious ads on the ads server were 
created to respectively exploit each vulnerability.  
 
4.4. Collecting data with the audit hooks 
 
After implementing the case study, we injected the 
audit hooks in every function which accessed any 
sensitive data, following the process described in 
Section 3.3. Next, we launched the advertisement 
server and the data aggregation service. Finally, we 
turned on the SecuWear server to allow the hooks to 
log their events for analysis.  
To explore and capture data regarding normal 
operations (Figure 5), we launched the app on Android 
and told the advertising server to send a legitimate 
advertisement to the app. It began communicating 
with its advertisement server and its data aggregator 
server. We also launched the Ubertooth and its audit 
hook, from a physically proximally located device (i.e. 
a device in the same room as the wearable and the 
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phone). This began collection of Bluetooth network 
data and streaming audited events to SecuWear.  
Next, we began gathering data for use in our 
analysis. Overall, we repeated each scenario (normal, 
code injection, denial of service) 25 times. In each 
case, we paired the app with the wearable. For the 
attack scenarios, we instructed the advertising server 
to serve up the appropriate malicious advertisement.  
Henceforth, we refer to each repetition of the 
scenario as a run. Each run ran the scenario for 
approximately two minutes. During those two 
minutes, the audit hooks gathered data from each 
component in the system. The Ubertooth data was 
monitored in WireShark to confirm that a 
CONNECT_REQ packet [36] was captured after 
pairing. Connection requests are specific packets in 
the Bluetooth protocol that signal and initiate the 
pairing process. Since Bluetooth LE has 3 channels 
where this can occur, the Ubertooth does not always 
capture the packet [15]. This can be overcome by using 
three Uberteeth. Once connection was confirmed, we 
let the run continue for the two minutes. If a 
connection was not confirmed, the run was restarted. 
At the end of each run, captured events on SecuWear 
were arranged chronologically into event traces and 
output to a CSV file for analysis.  
After capturing 25 runs of each scenario, for a total 
of 75 runs, we observed each run had an average of 
669 events in their trace, with individual runs having 
event totals in the range 305-1,674. In total, this 
amounted to 50,249 events. 
 
4.5. Feature Selection 
 
To analyze the data and apply our chosen 
supervised machine learning techniques described in 
Section 3.4 we went through a series of processes: 
dataset cleaning and preparation, feature selection, 
division of the data into training and test sets, model 
creation, and classifier assessment analysis.  
Our data cleaning process consisted of two steps: 
1) removed malformed events (this only occurred in 
two of the ~45000 total events); 2) remove network 
traffic for other devices on the network (i.e. with mac 
addresses that do not match the phone or wearable). 
To reduce dimensionality and complexity, we 
applied a mutual information feature selection 
criterion [37] to filter the total available features in the 
data to only those related to event and eventTypes. 
From the 75-run dataset, we extracted unique 
occurrences of various eventtypes and events. The 
eventtypes are categories of events that occurred 
during the various scenarios.  
There are 17 different eventtypes, 2 from the BLE 
audit hook captured by Ubertooth – ATT and LE LL. 
ATT indicates a packet capture event with ATTribute 
data was received. LE LL is also a packet capture 
event, but occurs at a lower layer down from ATT. It 
usually relates to non-data transfer in Bluetooth. Both 
types relate to the BLE protocol used for connection 
and data exchange between MetaWear and Android 
app.  The remaining 14 eventtypes include – ‘Activity 
created’, ‘Activity destroyed’, ‘Blte server from 
MetaWewar binded’, ‘Chart updated’, ‘Creating user 
interface’, ’Interaction with JavaScript’, ’Item 
selected’, ’MetaWear board prepared’, ’Reset’, 
‘Sensor initialized’, ‘Superclass constructor invoked’, 
‘User interface created’, ‘axis setting configured’, and 
‘x-axis configured to end’. These types are specific to 
the Metawear Android app and relate to different 
functions being called as thermometer data was 
collected by MetaWear, displayed to the user, and sent 
to data aggregator web service.   
There were 32 unique events which were grouped 
into the various eventTypes across the 75 runs. 11 
among them were generated by the BLE channel 
across the ATT and LE LL eventTypes. Among the 11 
events from BLE channel ‘ADV_IND’ and 
‘ADV_DIRECT_IND’ were connectable undirected 
and directed advertising events created by the 
MetaWear device. ‘ADV_NONCONN_IND’ was a 
non-connectable undirected advertising event created 
by MetaWear. ‘ADV_SCAN_IND’ was a scannable 
undirected advertising event which indicates a device 
cannot be connected to but can respond scan requests. 
‘SCAN_REQ’ and ‘SCAN_RSP’ were scan requests 
sent by the Android device and scan response events 
sent back by the MetaWear device. ‘CONNECT_REQ’ 
was a connection request event sent by the Android 
device to connect to MetaWear. The other four were 
LLID:0 to LLID:3 were events which occurred during 
data exchange between MetaWear and Android and 
indicate that Bluetooth variable reads/writes. 
The remaining 21 events were generated by the 
Android app. Each was of the form ‘<foo> method 
executed’ indicating the execution of method foo at 
some point during the run. Within this group, we can 
classify the 21 events into two classes: 1) interaction 
with the JavaScript Interface (e.g. by a webview), and 
2) execution of methods for connection and data 
exchange (e.g. from the MetaWear or to the 
aggregating web service).  
 
4.6. Dataset division and Model creation 
 
We created two models, one based on eventType 
categories and one based on events. We set aside 80% 
of our data for training and reserved 20% for testing. 
To prevent sampling bias, we randomly applied the 
80/20 sampling categorically across the three types of 
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runs, i.e. 80/20 code injections, 80/20 denial of 
service, and 80/20 normal data. This ensured a 
representative sample of each categorically group was 
present in both the training and test data. Using the 
sampled training data, we trained a model using the 
event features and a second on the eventType features. 
 
4.7. Case study: Results and discussion 
 
Table 1 contains the average precision and recall 
for each ML technique applied over the eventType 
feature set. Similarly, Table 2 contains the average 
precision and recall for each ML technique applied to 
the event features. “Standard” definitions of precision 





where TP is a true positive, FP is a false positive, and 
FN is a false negative. To compute average precision 
and recall we ran 40 trials using stratified random 
sampling to sample from the 75 run dataset – training 
each algorithm on the dataset each time and then using 
the test set to compute precision and recall. Our 
experiment shows that SVM worked best for attack 
detection in both datasets, while Naïve Bayes 
performed poorly, and the other techniques fell 
somewhere in between. It should be noted that since 
the model is fine grained, i.e. trained to recognize 
different attacks not just attack/non-attack,  precision 
and recall are fine-grained as well.   
Table 1. Average precision obtained from 
various classification models on dataset with 






precision 81% 86% 59% 72% 
Average 
Recall 80% 85% 60% 67% 
 
Table 2. Average precision obtained from 
various classification models on dataset with 






precision 73% 88% 67% 75% 
Average 
Recall 73% 83% 67% 68% 
 
While the specifics of these attack scenarios and 
the efficacy of the ML techniques for attack detection 
are interesting, the results of our study lend support 
for the use of audit hooks towards capturing 
relevant application data to support security 
investigations.  
The high precision and recall suggest that our 
approach could be useful as “one more tool in the 
shed” for dynamic security testing. This claim is, as 
noted in our methodology, limited to this case. 
Generalizing it to larger and other cases may be 
possible, but would involve additional study – as we 
note later in the limitation discussion below.  
Another question we wanted to explore was what 
size of data would be required to get results in our case. 
To answer this question, we examined the relationship 
between training size and false positive / false negative 
rates to identify the minimum threshold of sample size 
required to train the SVM model and obtain acceptably 
stable results. Measuring this, we varied the size of the 
training set used to train the SVM model and, for each 
size, computed the average false positive and negative 
rates. Figure 8 display these results graphically. From 
the graph we can see that, at least for this data, training 
set sizes with at least 30 runs provided moderate 
results, but larger sizes are certainly desirable. From 
this data, it is reasonable to suggest that the criticality 
of the software/system under test could reasonably 
govern the choice of training set size. For low 
criticality systems, a smaller training set (less data 
collection time) might be justifiable. The results show 
that the data obtained by audit hooks can be efficiently 
used to generate models and classify attacks from non-
attacks. Almost all attack scenarios are detected, with 
average precision of no less than 86%. It should be 
noted that although our model was trained after the 
various data capture runs, the model could operate in 
real-time to detect and report threats as they emerge. 
 
Figure 8: False positive and false negative 




5. Limitations and conclusion 
 
Our multi-component security analysis audit hooks 
provide knowledge that spans component boundaries. 
While this can be illustrative and helpful for 
identifying component-spanning attack vectors and 
vulnerabilities, it comes at a cost. That cost is the need 
to insert audit hooks in each function of interest. This 
constitutes a non-trivial amount of DevOps time. This 
limitation could be mitigated with tool support that 
encourages developers to insert audit hooks during the 
development process – instead of as an afterthought. 
In addition to this, our results are limited by the 
number of cases studied, the number of attacks 
explored, and the size of the dataset considered in the 
evaluation. These factors suggest that the reader 
should be careful not to overly generalize the results. 
Taken for what it is, the case study provides a proof-
of-concept that the data captured by audit hooks in IoT 
systems can be used for ML and classification in 
support of security analysis and weakness mitigation.  
Future work will focus on generalizability to 
explore how well the results hold for other cases and 
contexts. We also look forward to using the audit 
hooks to support additional helpful features for 
security evaluation such as mining collected event data 
to isolate vulnerable components and make mitigation 
suggestions for resolving potential security issues.   
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